Physics, Therefore God (Part 2)

A Look at Certitude Based Upon Scientific and Philosophical Principles

A continuation of the original, beginning with Scholastic input.

The Scholastic Views

However, even though actual infinites cannot really exist, God is infinite.  Aquinas, in the Summa Theologiae, addresses this.  He says: “We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite”.[1]  While this might seem tautological, he uses it as a springboard to discussing matter and form, how matter is made finite by form, and how, since “the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being…it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect”.[2]  This sets God apart as ontologically different from every other being, and because of this, nothing besides God can be actually infinite.[3]  Aquinas also puts this in terms of physical bodies:

Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.[4] 

This seems to be more along the lines of what might be understood to be a potential infinite and aligns closely with Craig’s understanding.  To put this metaphorically, imagine standing in a large room.  There are seemingly countless places to stand in this room, so many that it “approaches infinity”, but one is still bound by the limits of the room.

            Analytic Thomist Edward Feser puts this in a slightly more approachable style.  Both he and Craig oppose four-dimensional time of “diachronic identity”.[5]  Both of them explain this as humans (and other “persisting material object[s]”[6]) existing as “spacetime worms”.[7]  Basically, this gives physical objects not only spatial existence, but also temporal existence, and renders this existence to be a collection of temporal parts.  Feser presents two scholastic objections to this.  First, “the very notion of temporal parts is in various ways seriously problematic”.[8]  This is because holding to temporal parts causes problems in understanding space-time and logical inconsistencies.  The second problem is “that the theory denies the reality of change”.[9]  This is a problem, for Aquinas speaks of potentiality as part of the soul.[10]  Craig also defends God as a “changeless” being, which for Aquinas would mean he is pure act.  As such, everything but God would experience change in some way.  This second problem should be self-evident in its refutation. 

Intelligent Design

Returning once again to some scientific principles, based on a brief glance at the mathematical and physical constants of the universe, one can only assume there is Intelligent Design (ID). William Lane Craig defines ID as “a theory of justifiable inferences”, seeking to answer: “what justifies us in inferring that design is the best explanation of some phenomenon?”[11]  If one were to see a playground ball in the middle of the desert, one could not reasonably assume that it just happened to be there.  As Dr Craig would say, if the ball were expanded to the size of this planet, the need for an explanation would still remain.  Following the work of mathematician William A. Dembski, Craig argues “that a design inference is justified when two conditions are met: first, the event to be explained is extraordinarily improbable and, secondly, the event corresponds to an independently given pattern”.[12]

Saying that ID proves the existence of the Christian God is taking it beyond its reasonable boundaries, as its inference is “not…to theism but merely to some sort of intelligent agency”.[13]  In fact, though a staunch Christian, Craig does not necessarily hold to all the tenets of ID (understood as a scientific theory), since he prefers to draw a line between metaphysical and scientific “proofs”.  But, ID can provide more evidence that the existence of God is reasonable to hold without fear of error.

Conclusion and Final Thoughts

In conclusion, a few epistemological considerations can be made regarding this entire topic.  First, we can have knowledge of God’s existence.  Through assent from certitude, we can know he exists.  This statement conforms to a reality both as we know it and as it can be perceived through the senses. And, we have sufficient justification for these beliefs, as shown through science, mathematics, and philosophy.  Despite what it may seems to us, we do not have direct proof of God’s existence.  This knowledge is not self-evident because it is not clear to either the senses or the intellect.  We have indirect proof of God’s existence because we can take what is self-evident and reason to that conclusion.  In terms of the proposition “God exists”, the evidence provided by science, mathematics, and philosophy (along with many other fields not covered in this paper) is the ultimate motive of certitude.[14]  Based on the evidence presented here, and countless more that could not be covered, it is reasonable to hold the belief that “God exists” without fear of error.  Thus, we have certitude.

Having the right answer to the question “Does God exist?” is arguably the most important philosophical foundation upon which one can base the rest of life.  If one should answer “yes”, he is most likely to order his decisions to reflect that belief, just as one who did not believe would most likely reflect that in his actions.  Belief in God makes one more ready to believe in the natural law, objective moral values, and other tenets that would generally help one to be considered a “good person”.[15]  Belief in God would actually help one be more objective in empirical science, as one would not need to create mental pretzels and word salads to explain scientific principles from a purely naturalistic perspective.  This goes for other academic areas as well.  Hopefully, this paper provided a brief overview of how the sciences and math, along with philosophy, point to the existence of God, and can help some begin the journey of belief.    

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 7, a. 1, co., at New Advent, at newadvent.org.

[2] ST, I, q. 7, a. 1, co.

[3] See ST, I, q. 7, a. 1, ad. 3, and a. 2, s.c.

[4] ST, I, q. 7, a. 3, s.c.

[5] Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, (Heusenstamm: editiones scholasticae, 2014), 222.  See also Craig, “Presentism and Past Existence”, at reasonablefaith.org.

[6] Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 223.

[7] Craig, “Presentism and Past Existence”, at reasonablefaith.org.

[8] Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 226.

[9] Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 227.

[10] ST, I, q. 77, a. 1, ad. 7.

[11] William Lane Craig, “Should Christians Accept Intelligent Design?”, at Reasonable Faith (3 May 2015), at reasonablefaith.org.

[12] William Lane Craig and Francisco Ayala, “Is Intelligent Design Viable? The Craig-Ayala Debate”, at Reasonable Faith (2009), at reasonablefaith.org.

[13] Craig, “Should Christians Accept Intelligent Design?”, at reasonablefaith.org.

[14] Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, 128.

[15] For more on objective moral values and God’s existence, see William Lane Craig, “Slaughter of the Canaanites”, at Reasonable Faith (6 August 2007), at reasonablefaith.org.